

11 January 1957

Copy No. 131

**CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN**

DOCUMENT NO. 22
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X
11 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2001
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE 12-22-77 REVIEWER:

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

State Dept. review completed

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

CONTENTS

1. OPPOSITION STRENGTH WORRIES GOMULKA REGIME

25X1A

[redacted]

25X1A

2. SHOWDOWN IN ALGERIA MAY BE NEAR

[redacted]

25X1A

3. ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ADAMANT ON GULF OF AQABA AND GAZA ISSUES

[redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

25X1A

7. THE NEW BRITISH PRIME MINISTER

[redacted]

ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee

[redacted]

25X1A

25X1A

[redacted]

25X1A

1. OPPOSITION STRENGTH WORRIES GOMULKA REGIME

25X1A

[redacted] 25X1A 25X1X
The Gomulka regime is [redacted] 25X1X
[redacted] 25X1X
[redacted] disconcerted by
the extent to which the pro-Soviet "Natolin"
elements within the Polish United Workers'
(Communist) Party (PZPR) have succeeded
in fomenting opposition during the campaign
for the parliamentary elections of 20 Janu-
ary.

Natolin elements have taken advantage of the chauvinist feelings of the population to stimulate antiminority, particularly anti-Semitic, sentiment. The increasing frequency and severity of incidents have placed the regime at a political disadvantage by forcing it to defend the minorities. A whispering campaign is also being conducted to defame regime leaders by charging them with Nazi collaboration or Stalinist associations.

The movement to urge voters to scratch from the single electoral list the names of regime leaders, PZPR candidates and prominent figures in favor of local candidates has gained momentum. Voters are also being encouraged to believe that since the election results will be rigged anyway they might as well abstain.

As a result of these tactics, party leaders are reportedly now afraid that a number of central committee members will not be elected and that in many regions party members will be defeated by nonparty candidates. [redacted] 25X1

Comment

The regime press has charged the opposition with attempting to sabotage the elections, and politburo member Morawski complained publicly

on 2 January that those "negativists" within the party who oppose Poland's independent road to socialism "do not shrink from unworthy methods of struggle in order to maintain their position."

The press has also charged, in a thinly veiled reference to Poland's Communist neighbors, that "all those abroad" who are hostile to changes in Poland would not fail to take advantage of opportunities to "blacken Poland as an unenlightened backward country not deserving independence."

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

2. SHOWDOWN IN ALGERIA MAY BE NEAR

25X1A

25X1

[REDACTED] a major showdown among the rebels, the European settlers and the French administration may occur shortly before or during the UN discussion of the Algerian problem late this month. The American consul general in Algiers believes it is likely to involve considerable bloodshed.

[REDACTED] The rebels, who recently accelerated their terrorist attacks, have called for an "immense national manifestation" through a week-long general strike to coincide with the UN debate. [REDACTED] a general Moslem "insurrectional" strike may start on 12 January.

25X1A

25X1

Simultaneously, tension is reported mounting at an alarming rate among European Algerians who fear abandonment by France. Indications are that French extremists are preparing to counter further Moslem unrest with a substantial show of their own force and that they may be supported by at least some elements of the French military which has largely taken over administrative operations in Algeria. This danger is pointed up by the arrest in late December of a French general charged with plotting to overthrow Minister Robert Lacoste and establish an Algerian republic controlled by the settlers. [REDACTED]


25X1

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

3. ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER ADAMANT ON GULF OF AQABA AND GAZA ISSUES

25X1A



Israeli prime minister Ben-Gurion told Ambassador Lawson on 8 January that while Israel "has no territorial ambitions anywhere in Sinai," it "has to have" the Gulf of Aqaba waterway. Ben-Gurion said, "No more will we be subject to Nasr's whims or charity. If he tries to re-establish the blockade, then we shall have to start shooting."

The prime minister reiterated that he cannot permit Egypt to regain authority in the Gaza strip and that he believes a UN force there could not control Egyptian fedayeen activity. He hinted that he would like to see Israeli police control maintained under UN supervision if this would satisfy world opinion.

Comment

The Israeli cabinet reportedly met on 10 January to consider its position on further withdrawal from Sinai. Israel's demands regarding Gaza and Aqaba will probably be supported by Britain and France. The British UN delegate told Ambassador Lodge on 9 January that "we would be worse off than before 29 October" if no changes are made in the Gaza and Aqaba situations.

25X1A

25X1D

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

25X1A

**7. THE NEW BRITISH PRIME MINISTER**

25X1A



The 62-year-old British chancellor of the exchequer, Harold Macmillan, who became prime minister on 10 January, is a forceful initiator of progressive


domestic policies and a champion of closer relations with the Continent. In view of his intimate association with the Suez intervention, however, Macmillan will inherit most of Eden's difficulties in trying to restore confidence in a Conservative British government.

The new prime minister is given the main credit for having persuaded the Conservative Party to endorse the government's decision to withdraw its forces from Egypt. Macmillan also probably reaped political advantage from the fairly widespread resentment within the party at R. A. Butler--the "heir apparent"--for his "fence sitting," especially during Eden's absence in Jamaica. The speed with which Macmillan took measures to prevent a serious financial crisis after Suez received a favorable public reception.

Macmillan's first action was to announce that he would not call an early general election. The government's first chance to assess initial public reaction to the change in leadership, therefore, will come in three pending by-elections in marginal constituencies.



25X1A



25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3

ANNEX

25X1A

Watch Report 336, 10 January 1957
of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the
Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. A deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is improbable in the immediate future.*

25X6

25X1A

Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002900150001-3